In his address to West Point cadets last May, President Obama announced a new plan to combat the spread of terrorism in Africa and the Middle East, specifically through the use of a $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). By August 2014, the White House drafted a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism efforts in Africa. The statement included a plan to partner with and train African militaries to fight against al-Shabab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda, among others.
U.S. Special Operations have shifted from relying heavily on door-busting, high tech “direct action”—at least publicly—to focusing on security force assistance. Linda Robinson, a Senior International Policy Analyst at RAND has endorsed the need to utilize U.S. SOF capabilities beyond direct kinetic action. This includes both host-nation training as well as other “indirect action” skills in the service of fostering stronger security partnerships. Meanwhile, the former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, retired Admiral William McRaven, stated in 2012 that the keys to successful “indirect action” are “empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations.”
As terrorist organizations exploit security vacuums across Africa, President Obama has looked to the U.S. military, and more specifically SOF, to bolster the capacity and capabilities of local partner forces. SOF, with their unique skills as well as cultural and language expertise, are optimized for training and assisting foreign militaries in counter-terrorism efforts. However, with a force that is deployed in over ninety nations and is allocated only 1.6 percent of the Department of Defense budget, it is evident that special operations’ African training and counterterrorism funding levels are not consistent with their growing number of assignments—eighty-one separate missions in the last year.
However, members of Congress have refused to fully fund the CTPF, believing it would act as a “slush fund”. In December of 2014, only $1.3 billion was allocated from the requested amount. Moreover, due to legislative language in the CTPF, the majority of that allotted funding was required to go toward operations in Syria, not Africa. This deep cut constrains the president’s plans to train militaries and combat terrorism in Africa.
It is unfortunate that Congress fails to see the need for increased funding to allow for SOF operations in Africa. Recent airstrikes conducted by Nigeria and Kenya highlight the need to further train African nations in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Airstrikes by Nigerian forces against Boko Haram have misfired into the civilian populations, while eyewitnesses claim Kenya’s recent airstrikes against Al-Shabab attacked an area without the militant group’s presence, resulting in three civilian casualties. Meanwhile, Kenyan Special Forces were deployed seven hours after Al-Shabab’s gruesome April 2 Garissa University attack began—an alarmingly slow response time that led in part to the massacre of 147 students. U.S. SOF training could help such security forces overcome these shortfalls to better protect their citizens and counter the threat from these militant groups
If congressional members are concerned with the effectiveness of SOF training, they should not be. Although nothing is guaranteed, U.S. SOF have been largely successful in training militaries to combat terrorism in other parts of the world. Admiral McRaven has noted that SOF initiatives to train and partner with Afghan Security Forces were “our greatest success in Afghanistan.” In the Philippines, Special Operations Forces recently ended a thirteen-year train and assist effort, which saw the terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf reduced in size from 1,300 to 400 militants. In Colombia, U.S. Special Operations trained Colombian forces to combat terrorist attacks on a crucial oil pipeline, helping reduce the attacks from 179 in 2001 to forty-one in 2002. Prior to that operation, U.S. SOF, specifically Army’s Delta Force, began extensively training Colombian police teams in 1992; by 1993, those police teams were able to locate and kill notorious drug kingpin Pablo Escobar.
However, the reliance on SOF “indirect action” will not be able to maintain a high success rate without the proper resources, both in terms of time and funding. Success will not happen overnight. The poor performances by U.S. SOF-partnered militaries in Libya and Mali, illustrate this point. As a former U.S. Special Operations Officer noted on Libyan training and partnerships, “The take-away here is they’re going to take a lot more adult supervision to make sure the checks and balances are in place,” and more supervision will likely call for more financial backing.
Furthermore, the deep cuts in the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund have affected the special operations units’ key command partner in the region, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in battling a recent spike in African terrorist activity. AFRICOM provides crucial support for special operations in Africa and also partners with U.S. SOF to run African training exercises such as the large, ground-based, three-week long Flintlock. Launching in 2006, Flintlock is designed to strengthen African partnerships and train soldiers to handle multiple scenarios including medical aid and tactical kinetic operations. A failure to fund these sorts of multilateral exercises impairs SOF counter-terrorism efforts across the region.
The nature of war is changing, particularly in Africa. Traditional warfare is being replaced by nonconventional hostile engagements. With this shift, the United States increasingly relies on SOF to train allies and combat adversaries. The stability of the U.S. special operations in Africa, a crucial means of preventing the spread of terrorism, will depend on Congress’ awareness of SOF’s vital role in the region and authorization of a more robust CTPF. U.S. special forces stationed in Africa can only do so much when they are given so little.
Sam Ehrlich is a research intern for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a 2013 graduate of the George Washington University.
